

A Report on *Religious Naturalism Today* (SUNY Press 2008)

Jerome A. Stone

Collegium 2008

[Portions of this paper are taken or adapted from my *Religious Naturalism Today: The Rebirth of a Forgotten Alternative*, State University of New York Press, 2008.]

Religious naturalism, a once-forgotten option in religious thinking, is making a revival. It seeks to explore and encourage religious ways of responding to the world on a completely naturalistic basis without a supreme being or ground of being. The purpose of this book is to trace this story and to analyze some of the issues dividing religious naturalists.

Part One deals with the birth of religious naturalism, from George Santayana's *Interpretations of Poetry and Religion* in 1900 to Henry Nelson Wieman's *The Source of Human Good* in 1946. Chapter One deals with the philosophers who developed this viewpoint. Chapter Two presents the views of theologians. Chapter Three analyzes some of the issues debated between these early naturalists and presents a variety of attempts to develop a naturalist view of the mind. The Interlude between the first and second parts briefly explores religious naturalism in literature and art. Part Two depicts the rebirth of religious naturalism following the publication of Bernard Loomer's *The Size of God* in 1987. Over twenty current writers are presented. Chapter Four analyzes three different sources of religious insight among contemporary religious naturalists, including experiences of grace and obligation, nature both as appreciated and as the object of scientific study, and the hermeneutics of religious and literary traditions. Contested issues are discussed in Chapter Five, including whether nature's power or goodness is the focus of attention and also on the appropriateness of using the term "God." Chapter Six sketches the contributions of other recent religious naturalists. Chapter Seven ends the study by exploring what it is like on the inside to live as a religious naturalist.

I

Religious naturalism: An Introduction

One A 2-step definition:--

First step: Naturalism---the belief or worldview that there seems to be no distinct and superior God, soul or heaven. The opposite of naturalism is supernaturalism. The term "natural" in naturalism includes the human. It does not refer to the non-human world exclusively.

Second step: Religious Naturalism---the belief that a religious life is possible within a naturalistic worldview.

Two Who are the Religious Naturalists? Well-known religious naturalists include Spinoza, Santayana, Dewey, Henry Nelson Wieman, Bernard Meland (I would claim), Ralph Burhoe, Ursula Goodenough, William Murry, Karl Peters, Sharon Welch, David Bumbaugh and William Jones.

Three Related views:--

Humanism (I am thinking here of Dietrich, Reese, and the *Humanist Manifesto*) is a subset of Religious Naturalism. Devotion to truth and human betterment are the religious element in their naturalism.

Pantheism either is a subset or intersects with Religious Naturalism.

Process theology in its Whiteheadian and Hartshornean embodiments are not examples of Religious Naturalism (unless one accepts David Griffin's terminology). However, the term *process theology* is sometimes used, especially in UU circles, to include Wieman, who is a Religious Naturalist.

Four Who uses the term *religious naturalism*? In 1841 in *The Essence of Christianity* Feuerbach refers to a naturalism that is religious. The term was in frequent use in writings coming from the University of Chicago's Divinity School in the 1940's. There was a nearly complete hiatus in religious naturalistic writing from Wieman's *The Source of Human Good* (1946) to Bernard Loomer's *The Size of God* (1987). Hence my book is subtitled *The Rebirth of a Forgotten Alternative*.

Five Can we prove religious naturalism? No, but it is a surmise which makes sense to a number of people. A case can be made for it, but that would take too much space here.

II

The Use of the Term "God"

Naturalists with a religious orientation tend to take one of at least three stances regarding the use of God-language. Some, like Spinoza or the later Bernard Loomer, use it to refer to the universe as a whole, particularly when considered from a religious perspective. Others, like Henry Nelson Wieman, use the term to refer to a particular process within the universe, generally that strand which is productive of good or value. Finally, there are those who reject the use of the term altogether as unhelpful and even dangerous. There are variation upon these three approaches, such as my own reluctance to use the term and then generally with a pluralistic bent, but these three approaches toward the use of the term constitute a helpful typology. What is important to note is that there are some religious naturalists, like Gordon Kaufman and Karl Peters, who are theistic naturalists and there are others like Donald Crosby and William Murry who are not.

III

Sources of Religious Insight in Religious Natralism

One of the discoveries in writing this book is that there is a rich tapestry of material from which naturalists draw religious insights. The following is a categorization and some illustrations.

One Experiences of Grace and Obligation Although I might mention Sharon Welch or William Jones, I shall use my own reflections to illustrate this category. The main written source is my earlier *The Minimalist Vision of Transcendence*.

Now I wish to select two events from my experience which I have learned to think of as sacred. I will briefly depict them. *What I wish to emphasize is their overriding importance in my life.* (Parts of this and the following page are from Stone 2000.)

I remember the day my father died. I was sitting in my apartment feeling rather sad when my daughter, at that time about eight years old, came home from school. When I told her what had happened, she said, “Oh, Dad” and put her arm around me. It was one of the most comforting and supportive moments of my life.

After Martin Luther King was murdered, some members both Black and White, of the city of Evanston, Illinois organized marches to put pressure on the city council to pass an open housing ordinance. At that time it was perfectly legal in that place to refuse to rent or sell a house to anyone, including Blacks and Jews, because of their race or ethnic origin. Now I was quite busy as a father, breadwinner and graduate student. Yet I felt that this was the right moment to pressure the city council. Also my wife and I felt that this was a way to educate our two children by direct participation in values that we held dear.

These events have illuminated things for me. I have learned to think of them as sacred. Reflection on them has helped shape my philosophy of life. An early religious training provided a set of ideas which helped me reflect upon some very personal experiences, ideas which were transformed in the process of interaction with these events. *Inherited language and lived experience have always been in transaction.* I have described these events *to call forth analogous events for the reader*, events which will be quite different and yet perhaps may share some features with my experience.

Starting with experiences of apparently transcendent resources and imperatives, I have developed a conceptual scheme for understanding these experiences within a naturalistic framework. According to this minimalist model, *the transcendent refers to creative powers and also felt norms which are relatively or situationally transcendent*, that is, transcendent to a specific situation as perceived yet naturalistically conceived as immanent within the world. Within the limits of this naturalistic outlook, the transcendent dimension of powers and norms is understood as a collection of situation transcending creative powers and continually compelling norms. They are “relatively transcendent” to situations within the world yet are within the world as realities and relevant possibilities beyond a situation as perceived. Further this minimalist model makes a distinction between relatively transcendent resources and relatively transcendent

lures or challenges of values, such as the drive for truth, significant aesthetic form, authentic selfhood, and justice, which are never reached but only approximated. Thus they function as continually challenging imperatives. (The influence of Tillich's theology of culture can be seen here.)

First, the relative transcendence of continually challenging norms is illustrated by four types of relatively transcendent challenges: the drives toward truth, beauty, selfhood, and justice. These types furnish paradigms of relative normative transcendence but do not exhaust the variety of the search for values. These relative but continually challenging goals are the naturalistic analogue to the social critique of the Hebrew prophets, the drive toward wisdom for the Confucians, the value of the utopian vision as criticism from Plato onwards, and the smashing of idols from Augustine through Luther and Calvin and the radicals of the Protestant Reformation to the hermeneutics of suspicion of Kierkegaard, Marx, Nietzsche and Freud and the powerful social and psychological analyses of Henry Nelson Wieman, Reinhold Niebuhr, Paul Tillich and Langdon Gilkey

These four types of the drive toward the relative transcendence of continually challenging norms are regulative ideals. The struggles for truth, beauty, selfhood and justice are towards possibilities relatively transcendent to our present attainments and thus are regulative, not constitutive, ideals. They do not represent a transcendent realm of the already-attained or a realm ontologically superior to our present approximations to them. These norms remain continually challenging norms no matter how far we have come in their direction.

Second, the other pole of occasions of relative transcendence are those moments in which we experience creative resources in our environment which are transcendent to our situation as presently perceived. For example, openness to healing or restorative powers of medicine, counseling, or pedagogy means a readiness to receive creative and recreative powers relatively transcendent to our present situation and yet located within the world.

In *The Minimalist Vision of Transcendence* I have given analyses of courage in the face of finitude, courage to act in an opportune moment, and courage as an answer to despair. In this analysis I have stressed that such courage is not merely the result of choice and resolution but often also includes a receptivity to unexpected resources from outside of the perceived situation. Courage may come from the unexpected power of an anti-depressant or from the encouraging word of a friend. The occasions of the experience of these situationally transcendent resources are naturalistic analogues to the moments of experiencing gifts of divine empowerment (Stone 1992, 35-37, 106-108).

To summarize, I urge us to be open to norms and resources which are beyond our narrowly perceived present situation yet are not resident in a different realm. The transcendent element in these experiences refers to the continually challenging aspect of these norms which elude definitive attainment and to the situation transcending aspect of these resources which elude our present perception of the situation in which we find

ourselves. These two types of transcendence are naturalistically conceived in that the norms do not reside in a transcendent realm but are imaginatively conceived by humans within history and the resources do not intervene from a supernatural realm, but arise from within this world beyond our situation as perceived. Thus we have this-worldly or relative transcendence.

This element of transcendence is why this can be called a *religious* naturalism. All of the paradigm cases of religions point to a dimension beyond this life as perceived or values as attained. This form of naturalism, while not recognizing any supernatural realm, does maintain an openness to relative transcendence naturalistically conceived. This openness is sufficiently similar to the standard forms of religion that it is legitimate to call this, by analogy, a religious naturalism.

Finally, within the limits of what the author calls his minimalist approach, no claim is made that these norms or resources are unified. Norms may conflict and resources be in opposition. This is a radically pluralistic naturalism.

Recently I have articulated a simplified version of this minimalism in a theory of the sacred: 1) as a quality of events or processes of overriding importance, 2) not within our control, and 3) to be treated with respect. However, I insist, as a counter to fanaticism and superstition, that the sacred is not to be walled off from questioning, criticism, and rational-empirical inquiry.

Two Nature as Appreciated A number of recent writers stand in an old tradition of finding religious significance in the world of nature (here not excluding but not focused on the human). Delores LaChapelle and myself have been religious naturalists writing about this source of religious insight, but we shall use Gary Snyder here for our illustration.

The sources of Gary Snyder's religious naturalism can be traced in the events of his life. He grew up in the rural northwest of the United States and worked as a young man in the logging industry. During the period of the Beat writers he was a poet in San Francisco. Several years were spent in Japan as a student of Zen and Chinese poetry. In the past few decades he has been learning with his family to live lightly on the land in the foothills of northern California.

Snyder has always been observant of the non-human world. "From a very early age I found myself standing in awe before the natural world. I felt gratitude, wonder, and a sense of protection, especially as I began to see the hills being bulldozed for roads, and the forest of the Pacific Northwest magically float away on logging trucks" (Snyder 1995, 126-127).

He especially pays attention to the traits of a bioregion. Traveling by car, he carefully notes changes in the landscape. Driving in northern California from Yuba River canyon to Crescent City, he observes transitions through four different bioregions

(Snyder 1995, 219-221). Yet even for a careful observer like Snyder, it may be years before he observes a certain tree.

After twenty years of walking right past it on my way to chores in the meadow, I actually paid attention to a certain gnarly canyon live oak one day. Or maybe it was willing to show itself to me....But the years spent working around that oak in that meadow and not really noticing it were not wasted. Knowing names and habits, cutting some brush here, getting firewood there, watching for when the fall mushrooms bulge out are skills that are of themselves delightful and essential. And they also prepare one for suddenly meeting the oak (Snyder 1995, 263).

In his reflections on primal ways, Snyder has devoted attention to sacred land.

For people of an old culture....[c]ertain places are perceived to be of high spiritual density because of plant or animal habitat intensities, or associations with legend, or connections with human totemic ancestry, or because of geomorphological anomaly, or some combination of qualities....*Sacred* refers to that which helps take us (not only human beings) out of our little selves into the whole mountains-and-rivers mandala universe (Snyder 1990, 93-94).

The purpose of such transport is to return to what seems like the ordinary universe and to realize that it is of a piece with these special places and that a revivification of the apparently ordinary is possible. The trick is to listen to the land. It is not we who consecrate it, such as by making wilderness areas. Rather the land teaches us, if we let it.

“There is no rush about calling things sacred. I think we should be patient, and give the land a lot of time to tell us or the people of the future. The cry of a Flicker, the funny urgent chatter of a Gray Squirrel, the acorn whack on a barn roof—are signs enough” (Snyder 1990, 96).

Among the places where Snyder has learned the sacral quality of land are areas in the Australian outback where he was taught by tribal elders, among the Ainu in Japan, Shinto shrines, and American wilderness areas. The radical nature of this attention to the possibility that land might be sacred becomes clear when you think about the difficulty the American judicial system has in recognizing that land could be sacred to our native peoples. Reflection on these matters helps one realize that all of the models of civilization are not automatically acceptable. This does not mean that we should reject all of civilization, even if we could. It does mean that we are to work joyfully and with difficulty towards a new “future primitive.”

Three. Nature as scientifically understood A third source of religious insight for many religious naturalists is nature as scientifically understood. Among the writers examined in the book are Thomas Berry and Brian Swimme, Michael Cavanaugh, Ursula Goodenough, and Karl Peters. I choose Connie Barlow to illustrate this topic.

The topic of Connie Barlow's *Green Space, Green Time* concerns "ideas that might improve the human-to-Earth bond" (Barlow 1997, 11). She explores "the way of science." There are other ways to infuse ecological concern with the vision of the sacred: reform of monotheism, the way of the primal traditions, the way of transcendence (Daoism and Buddhism), and the way of immersion through direct contact with nature. The appeal of each of these paths to eco-religious experience will vary with each individual, but familiarity with the path of science will enrich the journey on each path. Barlow's construal of the way of science draws on the biological sciences, specifically evolutionary biology, conservation biology, ecology, and geophysiology. Other sciences such as quantum physics, chaos theory or the complexity sciences might be used. Barlow's method in the central four chapters is to report conversations with leading exponents of divergent views in these four branches of biology. We will focus on the first and last chapters, but much of the joy in reading this book comes from the conversations.

Barlow's concern is with meaning, with how an understanding of these four sciences can affect our moods, our commitments, and our sense of our roles on Earth and in the cosmos. Barlow, like Spretnak, strives to avoid the excesses of a postmodernist view. Science may not be able to tell us what it all means, but it is "one of the most important bases for meaning-making in today's world. The meaning drawn out of science by each individual who treads this path is a constructed, but not arbitrary, product of the human imagination. Despite the inherent subjectivity, meaning-making is not mere fabrication. It is a response to, a declaration of relationship with, Earth and the cosmos. To find meaning in the cosmos is no less legitimate than to have an aesthetic response to a landscape. Others may have a different response, but to be fully human is to have a response of some sort....Some interpretations may be more plausible than others. Some may be more useful. Some may provide us with a greater zest for living and acting with commitment." (Barlow 1997, 17-19).

Barlow stresses the openness of science to revision. Of course, this means that we may have to revise our worldviews from time to time. Science does not provide us with an unchanging foundation.

One move which Barlow makes is to suggest that all life forms find the world meaningful. "Meaning emerges with life" (Barlow 1997, 225). In this way meaning is not merely a matter of subjectivity, as both modernist and post-modernist can so easily affirm. So even to find the world meaningless is itself an interpretative act and does not provide an anchor for that assertion. Furthermore, meaning should not be limited to purpose. The universe may not have a purpose, but it is still meaningful.

Those who take the way of science do not usually have explicitly formulated ultimate beliefs, but in the process of writing her book Barlow came to realize that she had a strong commitment to four ultimates. Slightly condensing her words, four credos emerge:

- 1) the pageant of life,
- 2) the diversity of life, 3) the integrity of bioregions, and 4) this self-renewing

planet are evolution's great achievement" (Barlow 1997, 236-237).

Barlow stresses that this is a cosmologically based value system. It is derivative of the scientific creation story which she had rendered. This story is not identical with the scientific story, but it attempts to be faithful to it. "The epic that dances in my soul is a retelling of the strictly scientific story in a way that puts it on a par with mythic narratives that have long motivated human cultures. It is poetic, awesome, inspiring, accessible to my level of understanding, and deeply meaningful" (Barlow 1997, 237). She recognizes that not everyone who accepts the scientific portrayal of the history of the universe (including Stephen Jay Gould and John Maynard Smith) grounds their value system on this story.

This four-part credo is anchored in four ultimate values: the pageant of life, the diversity of life, bioregionalism, and Gaia. In a clear affirmation of religious naturalism, she declares: the transcendent source of these value is "this self-enriching cosmos" (Barlow 1997, 237). These values function in a way that is analogous, if not identical with, what we normally call religious. That is, they are sources of overriding trust and gratitude and call forth an overriding responsibility and obligation.

The four credos are not intended to generate an inter-human ethics. While they are anthropogenic, they are not anthropocentric. Yet to pursue these four ultimate values is not to turn our back on human needs, for ecological health promotes reduction of human-to-human tension. These four credos give a pluralistic richness which "offers an expanded toolkit for approaching the nuances of particular questions that emerge in the real world....For emotional wholeness as well as practical use in formulating (or justifying) my opinions on a range of is, they are sources of overriding trust and gratitude and call forth an overriding responsibility and obligation.

We are painfully aware of our ecological destructiveness, but "low species self-esteem" will not help (Barlow 1997, 213). We need a positive role to play while we lighten our ecological footprint. Underlying a sense of such a role will be a grounding image of our place in the world. She suggests multiple root metaphors for our relation to other beings: community, communion, and conversation (implying spontaneity and mutual creativity). Citing Berry and Swimme, she suggests for our self-image that "We are celebrants of the universe story....We *are* the universe celebrating itself. Here the expanded self and joyful expression merge." It is in humans that life has "roused into awe-struck wonder of immensely diverse ways of being (Barlow 1997, 271). Gaia awakened and aware is in our flesh. The meaning of life for us meaning-makers is to make meaning.

Four The Hermeneutics of Religious Traditions

A fourth source of religious insight for some religious naturalists is religious traditions, usually crystallized in written texts, either from the writer's own faith community or else from the world's religions. In the book I explore how a number of religious naturalists engage in the hermeneutics of religious traditions: William Dean, Willem Drees, Michael Cavanaugh, Karl Peters, Henry Levinson, and Charles Milligan. I use myself as the example here.

I urge that there is much to be learned from the religious traditions. My terms are “appropriation,” “dialogue,” “exploration,” “transaction,” “listening,” and “learning” (Stone 1992, 99-103; Stone 1997, 21-27, 421-436; Stone 2003, 792-798). In my earliest published treatment in *The Minimalist Vision of Transcendence* it would seem to be a minor aspect of the total exposition of my minimalist philosophy of religion. But the entire book is implicitly an exercise in the hermeneutics of retrieval of the Western monotheistic tradition from within a naturalistic framework. The explicit discussion has three foci: 1) world religions as illustrative of the triadic schema (this-worldly transcendence with real and ideal aspects) of the minimalist model of transcendence, 2) Jesus as paradigm of a life of service and care, and 3) how this life-style relates to life-styles advocated by other religious traditions.

I employ the notion of an “autonomous appropriation of tradition,” and differentiate between the original meaning of a tradition and its current significance. This is not merely looking down a well twenty centuries deep and seeing our own reflection. Rather it is a dialogue between the tradition (as faithfully reconstructed as possible, albeit from our perspective) and our own viewpoint, requiring the autonomy and integrity of our own viewpoint and the challenge of the tradition. Reflection on religious tradition has long been a philosophical task, since the time of Plato. Friedrich Schelling, Josiah Royce, Paul Ricoeur and Hans-Georg Gadamer were stimulus for me in developing what I call the hermeneutical task of the philosophy of religion (Stone 1992, 231 ns. 30, 34, 35, 37, 40.)

In *The Minimalist Vision of Transcendence* I engage in dialogue with Hindu, Buddhist, Confucian, Mohist, West African, and Muslim ethics on an ethics of prudent care. Convergences are found, many going beyond the no-harm principle and speaking of care for the oppressed. There are also differences in historical roots (which need to be examined in order to attain responsible autonomy, because they are not merely husks of an essential kernel), in the degree of universality of moral concern, and whether there is a priority of concern for those close at hand.

In a later article I focus on appropriating indigenous traditions, as a result of teaching African, and native American (Lakota, Dineh, Hopi) ways and a growing interest in retrievals of paganism by some figures in women’s spirituality (Stone 1997). A new note in this article concerns the identification and removal of obstacles which prevent appropriating insights from the older ways. This means that the hermeneut-learner has a responsibility to remove unnecessary hindrances to appropriation, perhaps leaving some hindrances as points of divergence. The entire article concerns identifying and removing the obstacles in relation to what are often dismissed as “primitive” religions. The obstacles include using outmoded categories, polytheism, superstition, female and animal deities, and others. Addressing these hindrances includes pointing out the frequent exaggeration of the difference between modern Western and older ways, rethinking the superiority of humans, and to realize that the early ways are not simply pre-scientific. I also suggest rethinking gender, ritual, embodiedness, sacred places, and using multiple images of time. Another new note is that I raise the question of whether

appropriation is possible or respectful. My answer is that appropriation will always involve a shift in meaning and that respect is a matter of intention and how it is done.

Recently my language shifts from “appropriation” to the less imperialistic “exploration” and “learning” (Stone 2003a). I elaborate on four functions that religion could perform in our moral life: challenge, specificity, empowerment, and values beyond morality, such as relating to moral failure (Stone 2003a, 792). When traditions are explored attention should be paid to this complex of functions. I also point out that the hermeneutical task has been undertaken by naturalists, including Spinoza, Santayana, Freud, George Herman Randall, Eustace Haydon, Marvin Shaw, Loyal Rue, and Charley Hardwick. My focus in this article is on the polarity of works and grace, or self-power and other-power in the large religions. Four hermeneutical principles are elaborated: 1) more than one tradition should be explored, while trying to avoid dilettantism, 2) the counterpoint of divergences within a tradition is significant, 3) original expression and later elaborations are both important, and 4) the process should eventuate in a dialogue or transaction with the possibility of change in the interpreter (Stone 2003a, 795-796).

Five The Hermeneutics of Culture A final source of religious insight for some religious naturalists is the interpretation of culture. In the book I treat both William Dean and Charles Milligan, the latter of whom I discuss here.

Charles Milligan is professor emeritus of philosophy of religion at Iliff School of Theology in Denver. He has been developing what he terms a naturalistic pantheism, a view which fits into what is here called religious naturalism. “Pantheism is the view that the whole of reality is God...I use the qualifying term *naturalistic* to make clear that this brand of pantheism is significantly different from panentheism, gnosticism, absolute idealism, materialism and spiritualism” (Milligan 1996, 235). This neo-naturalism will stress diversity and dynamics, allowing for varying degrees of connectedness from randomly assembled to organically bonded. Unlike some other versions, there is no Oversoul and there is room for individuality.

The agenda of Milligan’s hermeneutics is to trace the pantheistic motif in some American novelists, essayists and especially poets. He suggests that these writers have a considerable influence on religious thinking in America. He acknowledges a difficulty in interpretation. “It is a tricky business to discern from poetry what the poet’s theological position, if any, is. But in some cases the connection is clear....Sometimes a thinker manages to be both poet and theologian, but in the main the task of vivid particularism and that of coherent systematizing diverge. In view of that, it strikes me that turning to the poets is worthwhile for understanding the religious thought of a people. They may well emphasize views not conspicuously present in the voices of establishment professionals” (Milligan 1987, 585).

Milligan analyses selected passages from the writings of several Americans to illustrate his point: Whitman, Thoreau, Sidney Lanier, Richard Eberhart, Robinson Jeffers, Robert Penn Warren, Virginia Woolf, Stephen Crane and Harriet Monroe. Key to understanding Milligan’s pantheism is the note of “de-anthropocentrism.” He does not

mean that “human qualities of value lack significance, rather that humans hold no place of special privilege in the scheme of things.

For Milligan, “it was a remarkable shift, in less than a century, for the liberal American religious view to move from Deism toward Pantheism....It was due to the transition from the last stages of a mechanistic, Newtonian cosmology, which required an external Designer, to a biologically oriented, evolutionary view of nature, in which God would be more akin to growth and experimentation” (Milligan 1987, 588-589). Pantheism in this view is quite different from those contemporary American religions that conceive the All as Spirit, Mind, the Absolute, Soul or such. The anthropocentrism of the New Thought Movement or “Metaphysical Science” is quite different from the naturalistic and empirical orientation of pantheism.

Notes

Barlow, Connie. 1997. *Green Space, Green Time: The Way of Science*. New York: Springer-Verlag.

Milligan, S. Charles. 1987. “The Pantheistic Motif in American Religious Thought,” in Peter Freese, editor, *Religion and Philosophy in the United States of America*, Vol. 2. Essen: Die Blaue Eule

_____. 1996. “The Eco-Religious Case for Naturalistic Pantheism” in Donald A. Crosby and Charley D. Hardwick, editors, *Religious Experience and Ecological Responsibility*. New York: Peter Lang, 235-255.

Snyder, Gary. 1990. *The Practice of the Wild*. San Francisco: North Point Press.

_____. 1995. *A Place in Space: Ethics, Aesthetics, and Watersheds*. Washington, DC: Counterpoint.

Stone, Jerome A. 1992. *The Minimalist Vision of Transcendence: A Naturalist Philosophy of Religion*. Albany: State University of New York Press.

_____. 1997. “On Listening to Indigenous Peoples and Neo-pagans: Obstacles to Appropriating the Older Ways,” in *Pragmatism, Neo-Pragmatism, and Religion: Conversations with Richard Rorty*. Edited by Charley D. Hardwick and Donald A. Crosby. New York: Peter Lang..

B.

_____. 2000. “What is Religious Naturalism?,” *Journal of Liberal Religion*. (Fall) <http://www.meadville.edu>, [reprinted with addendum, *Religious Humanism*, Winter/Spring 2001, 60-74.]

_____. 2003. “Is Nature Enough? Yes,” *Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science*. 38 December, 783-800.